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The present paper examines an episode from the historiography of
the genesis of general relativity. Einstein rejected a certain theory in
the so-called “Zurich notebook” in 1912-13, but he reinstated the same
theory for a short period of time in the November of 1915. Why did
Einstein reject the theory at first, and why did he change his mind
later? The group of Einstein scholars who reconstructed Einstein’s
reasoning in the Zurich notebook disagree on how to answer these
questions. According to the “majority view”, Einstein was unaware of
so-called “coordinate conditions”, and he relied on so-called “coordinate
restrictions”. John Norton, on the other hand, claims that Einstein
must have had coordinate conditions all along, but committed a differ-
ent mistake, which he would repeat in the context of the famous “hole
argument”. After an account of the two views, and of the reactions by
the respective opponents, I will probe the two views for weaknesses,
and try to determine how we might settle the disagreement. Finally, I
will discuss emerging methodological issues.
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1 Introduction
The present paper examines an episode from the historiography of general
relativity (GR) that exhibits methodological problems of history and philos-
ophy of science. These problems emerge because there are two competing
accounts of an important episode from Einstein’s long path to GR.1 The
fact that two competing accounts exist is not particularly exciting in itself—
many episodes from the history of science have been retold in many, often
incompatible ways, and a plurality of accounts need not be a sign of funda-
mental methodological problems. Plurality can be due to different sources;
sometimes new sources are discovered; the same episode can be presented
from different vantage points, and approached with different questions; new
scientific knowledge can deepen our understanding of an episode, making
previous accounts obsolete. This will lead to different accounts of the same
historical episode in a natural and unsurprising manner.
The present case is different. The two competing views of the episode
exhibit a considerable unity in perspective, methods, and sources. The Ein-
stein scholars defending the diverging views worked over a period of ten
years on a reconstruction and interpretation of one of the most important
sources of Einstein scholarship, the “Zurich notebook”.2 This long and close
collaboration – I will call it the “genesis collaboration” – resulted in a jointly
authored book, the four-volume opus magnum on the genesis of GR, Renn
(2007). Despite the close collaboration, diverging views of crucial turning
points of the genesis of GR have emerged. A contribution by John Nor-
ton defends a “minority view” of the episode in question, while the rest of
the genesis collaboration, notably Jürgen Renn, Tilman Sauer and Michel
Janssen defend what I will call the “majority view”.
What is the disagreement? Einstein rejected a certain theory in the
Zurich notebook in 1912-13, while the very same theory was reinstated for
1Most articles relevant to the present paper can be found in Janssen et al. (2007a,b).
2See the introduction in Janssen et al. (2007a) for remarks on the collaboration between
Jürgen Renn, Tilman Sauer, Michel Janssen, John D. Norton, and John Stachel.
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a short period of time in the November of 1915. Why did Einstein reject
the theory in the notebook, and why did he change his mind in Novem-
ber 1915? The majority claims that there is one major difference between
the first and the second period, Einstein’s awareness of so-called “coordinate
conditions”. This is a now-standard mathematical procedure for bringing
the field equations of GR into correspondence with Newtonian gravitational
theory. The majority argues that Einstein was unaware of coordinate condi-
tions at the time of the notebook, and that he relied on so-called “coordinate
restrictions”, which severely limited the generality of the field equations and
made the theory unacceptable. Only when he became aware of coordinate
conditions did the theory become acceptable again. Norton finds this story
implausible. He claims that Einstein must have had the modern notion of
coordinate condition all along, but that he committed a different, more elab-
orate mistake. Importantly, this is a mistake that Einstein would repeat in
the context of the famous “hole argument”, a major roadblock on the path
to the final theory of GR.
I will discuss methodological issues that arise from this non-trivial dis-
agreement. Is this a dispute that cannot be settled despite a unity of evi-
dence and methods? There is hope, I will argue, that we can dissolve the
dispute. We can do better in the interpretation of the available evidence, in
the reconstruction of the scientific and mathematical context of Einstein’s
struggle, and we can challenge the internal consistency of the two views.
However, there are also fundamental methodological problems that we have
to navigate. There are boundary conditions of rationality that enter into the
reconstruction of historical episodes, for which there is no clear-cut justifi-
cation.
I provide a short introduction to the history of GR and to the most
important concepts in the upcoming section. I have tried to make the tech-
nical subject-matter of the episode accessible to non-specialists as much as
possible. I then give an account of the two views, and of the reactions to
the views by the respective opponents. After reviewing the arguments, I
will probe the two views for weaknesses, and try to determine how we might
settle the disagreement based on the available evidence, and on other consid-
erations. Finally, I will discuss emerging methodological issues based on the
previous discussion, and on methodological remarks by the parties involved.
2 A Bird’s Eye View of the Episode
The story of the genesis of GR can be told in the form of a drama in three
acts.3 The main character is Einstein, with appearances by other famous
physicists and mathematicians, notably his friend Marcel Grossmann, as well
3John Stachel (2007) has given an account of the genesis of GR in this form. The present
section serves as an introduction; technical details are mostly relegated to footnotes.
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as various mathematical and physical theories and concepts. The premise
of the drama is that not all is well in the house of gravitational physics.
There is tension between the new theory of special relativity (SR), which
constrains all physical theories and has a built-in finite speed of light, and the
old Newtonian gravitational theory (NGT), which works by instantaneous
action-at-a-distance. NGT will have to change, but how?
Enter Einstein, who sets out to reconcile the two theories by formulat-
ing a relativistic theory of gravitation. The core piece of the new theory
will be a field equation that generalizes the gravitational Poisson equation.
A gravitational field equation tells us how gravitation and matter, energy,
and momentum hang together. The first two acts of the drama go rela-
tively smoothly. In the first act, Einstein formulates the equivalence princi-
ple, which establishes a connection between accelerated reference frames and
gravitational fields. In the second act, he finds that the best way to repre-
sent the gravitational potential in the field equation is by the metric tensor,
a generalization of distance in Euclidean space to distance in space-times
with variable curvature.
At the beginning of act three, Einstein has learned how to represent
distance in space-time by the metric tensor, and he knows that energy-
momentum can be represented using the energy-momentum tensor.4 All
that is left to do is to find the gravitational field equation, which tells us
how space-time is influenced by the distribution of matter, energy, and mo-
mentum. Mathematically, the missing element of the field equation is a
differential operator, which acts on the metric and thereby tells us how the
metric and the energy-momentum tensor hang together. An appropriate dif-
ferential operator generalizes the Laplace operator of the Poisson equation.
This is where the reversal of fortune sets in. Einstein tests various candi-
dates, straightforward generalizations of the Laplace operator, and also other
candidates. However, none of them fits the bill. In a state of desperation,
Einstein turns to Marcel Grossmann, his mathematician friend, for help.
Grossmann is indeed able to help.5 He finds a mathematical theory, the
“absolute differential calculus”, proposed by the Italian mathematicians Gre-
gorio Ricci-Curbastro and Tullio Levi-Civita; this calculus is a framework
that provides candidate differential operators for the field equations. The
candidates are generally covariant, i.e., they keep their form under arbitrary
coordinate transformations. The single most important object is the Rie-
mann tensor; every possible generally covariant differential operator can be
4A detailed account of how the third act unfolded can be found in Renn and Sauer
(2007).
5The collaboration between Einstein and Grossmann resulted in several publications,
most importantly the so-called “Entwurf” (“outline”) theory (Einstein and Grossmann,
1995), which contains the first detailed exposition of tensor calculus in the context of GR.
The Entwurf theory does not yet formulate the final, correct field equations of GR; see
Sauer (2014) for an account of Grossmann’s contribution to GR.
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constructed from it. At the end of the drama, in November 1915, it will
turn out that the absolute differential calculus and gravitational theory were
right for each other all along. However, in 1912, Einstein and Grossmann do
not realize this and the final, correct field equations have to wait behind the
scenes.
Einstein and Grossmann use the Riemann tensor to derive the so-called
Ricci tensor, a promising candidate.6 However, Einstein soon rejects the
Ricci tensor as unsuitable for the field equation. This is a mistake, because
the reasons for the rejection are ill conceived. The root of the problem has
to do with the correspondence principle: The new field equation has to be
put in correspondence with the old, classical gravitational field equation—
the classical case should be recovered as a limiting case of the new, general
theory. In order to do this, one has to consider other, intermediate cases, such
as weak gravitational fields. At this point, Einstein is already experienced in
handling such intermediate cases, but this experience does not serve him well:
It generates wrong expectations about the form that special cases should
take. The rejection of the Ricci tensor is a consequence of these wrong
expectations.
Einstein then turns to the so-called “November tensor”7, a little brother
of the Ricci tensor. The November tensor can be found by decomposing the
Ricci tensor into two summands—one of these is the November tensor. It
is not a generally covariant object, but its covariance group still includes
some accelerated reference frames. At this point, the drama gets confusing.
Einstein is able to show that the November tensor does not run into the
same difficulties that had led him to eliminate the Ricci tensor. Despite this
apparent progress, Einstein eliminates the November tensor as well, and it
is not considered any further in the Zurich notebook. What prevented Ein-
stein from investigating the November tensor further? What is more, years
later, in November 1915, he returned to the November tensor and used it to
formulate a version of general relativity. What made the November tensor
acceptable again in November 1915? In later recollections, Einstein stated
reasons for rejecting the November tensor. However, Einstein’s explanations
are not entirely satisfactory; his later recollections cannot fully resolve the
puzzle.
Up to this point, the genesis collaboration agrees on how the drama
unfolded, but now, the views start to diverge. The disagreement concerns the
6From here on, the story can only be reconstructed on the basis of the Zurich notebook.
This part of the drama is now well understood thanks to the genesis collaboration; see
Janssen et al. (2007a,b). The following account of Einstein’s struggle is based on Norton
(2007, sec. 1).
7The name was coined by the genesis collaboration; the November tensor became
prominent in November 1915. It first appears on p. 22R of the Zurich notebook; see
Fig. 1. I use the standard pagination; see Janssen et al. (2007a); Klein et al. (1995) for
a facsimile of the notebook and Janssen et al. (2007b) for the commentary. Note that a
facsimile of the Zurich notebook is also available online at Einstein Archive Online.
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Figure 1: Top portion of page 22R of Einstein’s Zurich notebook. The first
line shows the Ricci tensor Til, next to Grossmann’s name. The Ricci tensor
is then split up into two parts; the second part, labelled “Vermutlicher Grav-
itationstensor”, is the so-called “November tensor.” Albert Einstein Archives
AEA 3-006. c©The Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
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reason why exactly the November tensor was rejected in the Zurich notebook.
If we compare Einstein’s calculations involving the November tensor in the
Zurich notebook in 1912–13, and in November 1915, there is one important
difference. In the notebook, Einstein uses coordinate conditions in a way
that differs from the modern usage. Coordinate conditions are a standard
operation to recover the old gravitational theory from the new field equations.
However, some of Einstein’s calculations do not make sense from a modern
point of view. Did Einstein deliberately apply coordinate conditions in a
way that deviates from modern usage, or was he not aware of the modern
usage? The two views under discussion disagree about how this question
should be answered. The majority claims that Einstein did not have the
modern notion of coordinate conditions at the time of the Zurich notebook.
Norton, on the other hand, claims that Einstein was aware of coordinate
conditions. Consequently, we get two different accounts of what led Einstein
to reject the November tensor in the notebook.
3 The Two Views
We now turn to the two competing explanations of what went on in the
November episode. The account given here is based on the detailed expo-
sition in Norton (2007).8 Norton first presents the majority view, and then
his own account. The reason why I use Norton’s account is that it explicitly
discusses, and accentuates, the contrast between the two views, while the
other contributions do not focus on this disagreement. I will later turn to
reactions of the majority view at the end of this section; this would serve as
a sufficient corrective if Norton’s account of the majority view were biased.
3.1 The Majority View
The majority view is that Einstein took field equations to have a special,
weak field form not just in some particular coordinate system, but in general.
This implies that Einstein had to reject the November tensor, as it does not
have the required form. In order to understand this explanation, two different
ways of using coordinate systems have to be distinguished.
Coordinate Conditions vs. Coordinate Restrictions
A generally covariant theory holds for arbitrary coordinate systems. In order
to apply the equations to concrete situations, one has to introduce special
coordinate systems. Coordinates can be introduced in different ways. One
possibility is to specify differential equations that the coordinates have to
8There is an accessible presentation of Norton’s view in Norton (2005). See Janssen
et al. (2007a, pp. 11), for a brief overview of the evolution of Einstein scholarship concern-
ing this episode.
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satisfy. This will fix a coordinate system only up to coordinate transforma-
tions that leave the differential equations invariant. Einstein may have used
coordinates in two different ways in the notebook.
Coordinate conditions in the modern sense are a standard procedure if
one wants to recover, say, the Newtonian limit. Newtonian gravitation in
its standard formulation is not generally covariant, only covariant under
Galilean transformations. Therefore, one may impose conditions on field
equations of broader covariance if one wants to recover the Newtonian limit.
Coordinate conditions do not restrict the covariance of the field equations;
they are only used in the context of obtaining the Newtonian limit, e.g.,
when the imposition of a weak field assumption is not sufficient to recover
Galilean covariance.
The examination of the Zurich notebook reveals that Einstein used coor-
dinates in a second, non-standard way. The genesis collaboration has called
this non-standard use coordinate restrictions. The introduction of coordi-
nates into field equations always yields a new expression with restricted
covariance. If coordinates are introduced as coordinate restrictions, the re-
sulting expression is interpreted as the new field equation, which is not only
valid under particular circumstances, but taken to be the gravitational field
equation as such. The field equations before the application of coordinate
restrictions are just an intermediate step in the derivation of the real field
equations.
Coordinate Restrictions for the November Tensor
Einstein shows on p. 22R that if the so-called “Hertz condition”9 is applied
to the November tensor, it reduces to the expected weak field form, an
important intermediate step to the Newtonian limit. However, Einstein did
not use the Hertz condition on p. 22R as a coordinate condition, but as
a coordinate restriction. This can be seen by examining a calculation on
p. 22L. Here, Einstein writes down two conditions, the Hertz condition, and
the condition for “unimodular transformations”10, the covariance group of the
November tensor. He then calculates the covariance of the Hertz condition
under unimodular transformations, i.e., he determines the covariance group
of the November tensor combined with the Hertz condition. This calculation
does not make sense if he wants to use the Hertz condition as a coordinate
condition.11 Subsequently, Einstein discards the Hertz condition. There is
9The name was coined by the genesis collaboration. It figures prominently in corre-
spondence between Einstein and Paul Hertz; see, e.g., Renn and Sauer (2007, p. 184).
10Unimodular coordinates require that the determinant of the Jacobian of the coordinate
differentials are equal to one.
11Only Galilean covariance is needed for the Newtonian limit, but it is easy to get
Galilean covariance, as the condition is invariant under linear transformations, which im-
plies Galilean covariance. However, Einstein does not eliminate terms from his calculation
that would vanish under linear transformations. Therefore, he is not after linear transfor-
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a second instance in the Zurich notebook where Einstein used coordinate
restrictions, not coordinate conditions.
The Majority’s Explanation
According to the majority view, the concept of coordinate restriction explains
the difference between the situation in the Zurich notebook and in November
1915 as follows. The November tensor does not have the form required for
the Newtonian limit. If Einstein was unaware of the possibility of using co-
ordinate conditions, this means that the November tensor was unacceptable
as a candidate for the field equations, but it could still be used as an inter-
mediary for a candidate with restricted covariance. Einstein therefore used
the Hertz condition as a coordinate restriction; this produced a new candi-
date gravitation tensor with restricted covariance. It is documented that in
November 1915, Einstein had acquired the notion of coordinate condition,
and the November tensor became acceptable.
The majority and Norton agree that in the Zurich notebook, Einstein
used coordinates in a way that can only be interpreted in terms of coordinate
restrictions. Both views presuppose that Einstein did not use the Hertz con-
dition as a coordinate condition. However, the majority view also assumes
that Einstein was unaware of the possibility of interpreting the application
of the Hertz condition to the November tensor as a coordinate condition. It
is on this point that the majority and Norton disagree.
3.2 Norton on the Majority View
The majority assumes that Einstein was unaware of coordinate conditions.
How plausible is this assumption? According to Norton, this question can-
not be settled on the basis of the available evidence. There are instances
where Einstein used coordinate restrictions in the notebook. However, in
other cases, it is unclear how he interpreted the use of coordinates; the “har-
monic coordinates”12 are an example for the latter. Einstein did not check
the covariance group of the harmonic coordinates. Norton concludes that
nothing in the notebook precluded Einstein from being aware of coordinate
conditions.
“Vermutlicher Gravitationstensor”
One central piece of evidence speaking against the assumption that Einstein
was unaware of coordinate conditions can be found on p. 22R of the notebook;
see Fig. 1. Einstein splits the Ricci tensor into two parts, one of which is the
mations.
12Einstein used harmonic coordinates to recover the weak field form of the metric in
the context of the Ricci tensor. Harmonic coordinates were available in the mathematical
literature as “isothermal coordinates” at the time of the notebook.
9
November tensor. He marks the November tensor with the label “presumed
gravitation tensor” (“Vermutlicher Gravitationstensor”). Norton writes that,
at this point, it must have been clear to Einstein that the November does not
have the necessary form to reduce to the Newtonian limit without a further
condition; he was sufficiently experienced to see this immediately. But if this
is the case, the label would be inappropriate. The November tensor would
not be the “presumed gravitation tensor”, but just another intermediate step
on the way to the right candidate; it would play the same role as the Ricci
tensor.
Now, this could be an oversight on Einstein’s part; he could have assigned
the label in haste. However, according to Norton, this is implausible. For
one, the page is neatly written, more like a summary than a hasty calculation.
Also, Einstein had probably discussed the November tensor with Grossmann
at this point—Grossmann’s name appears on the page. Furthermore, the
Hertz condition also appears on this page. Einstein’s hope may have been
that the November tensor reduces to the right Newtonian limit with the help
of the Hertz condition. However, if he interpreted the Hertz condition as a
coordinate restriction, then the November tensor would not be the “presumed
gravitation tensor”, but just an intermediary.
Evidence Against Coordinate Conditions?
Is there any clear evidence that Einstein was unaware of coordinate condi-
tions at the time of writing the notebook? Norton argues that this is not
the case. First, Einstein did not mention problems with coordinate condi-
tions later on. This is relevant because he frequently commented on mistakes
committed during the genesis of GR, from the hole argument to the wrong
assumption that the static metric has to be spatially flat. However, he never
mentioned problems with coordinate conditions later on. Second, coordi-
nate conditions are not needed in order to recover the Newtonian limit of
the Entwurf ; this explains why he never mentioned problems with coordi-
nate conditions in this context. However, he also failed to mention them
in other contexts where they may have been relevant. Third, Einstein had
shown that he was aware of different ways of using coordinates. A lack of
awareness of how to use coordinate conditions is implausible, because coor-
dinates and their use was one of Einstein’s motivations for the construction
of a generalized theory of relativity in the first place.
According to Norton, all of this suggests, or at least leaves open the
possibility, that Einstein was aware of the possibility of using coordinate
conditions in the notebook. Could Einstein have considered both coordinate
conditions and coordinate restrictions at the same time? If Einstein was
aware of coordinate conditions, new puzzles have to be solved. It is the
purpose of Norton’s account to spell out how the events surrounding the
November tensor unfolded if Einstein was aware of coordinate conditions.
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3.3 Norton’s View
Two problems have to be solved if we assume that Einstein was aware of
coordinate conditions at the time of the notebook. First, we have to explain
why Einstein was unable to recover the Newtonian limit of the November
tensor using the Hertz condition, because this calculation features on p. 22R.
Second, we have to explain why he stopped using coordinate conditions in
combination with the November tensor in the notebook. Of course, not
any explanation will do. If coordinate restrictions are not the explanation,
Einstein must have made some other mistake. It would be easy to just invent
an additional error – but this is not sufficient, as Norton points out: “The
real difficulty is to establish that the error was really committed” (Norton,
2007, p. 748).
There is one misconception that satisfies these requirements. Einstein ex-
plicitly defended this misconception, and admitted later on that it had been
a mistake. It is the mistake of “attributing an independent reality to coor-
dinate systems”13, which was later central in the infamous hole argument.
This mistake might also explain the puzzles of the November episode.
Norton conjectures that this misconception already shows up in the note-
book. This would explain why Einstein gave up on the use of coordinate con-
ditions on p. 22R of the notebook, and why he accepted the restricted covari-
ance of the Entwurf equations. He only reversed his mistake in November
1915. If Einstein made this mistake in the context of the November tensor,
the result would be that if a coordinate condition is applied, the covariance
of the theory is reduced, and coordinate conditions are not only valid in the
context of the Newtonian limit, but in general. Einstein may have realized
this on p. 22R, and therefore abandoned the use of the Hertz condition as a
coordinate condition.
Norton’s conjecture presupposes that the mistake of attributing an inde-
pendent reality to coordinates was tacit. The mistake was only made fully
explicit when Einstein withdrew the hole argument in late 1915. If he had
realized that he attributed an independent reality to coordinates in the note-
book, he would not have endorsed the position. It is plausible that Einstein
was not clear on this point, as he later had problems to spell out what exactly
had gone wrong in the hole argument.
The Hole Argument
Norton’s conjecture is based on an analogy to the hole argument. Einstein
came up with the hole argument in late 1913. It served as an argument
against the requirement that the field equations of general relativity should
13This formulation is used in Norton (2007) for this particular misconception. I will use
it as a technical notion in the present paper. It does not apply to the mistake of, say,
using coordinate restrictions instead of coordinate conditions.
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be generally covariant.
The argument runs as follows.14 Take a region of space-time that is free
of matter. In this region, the only field that can make a physical difference
is the metric. The metric g is a function of the coordinate system x, written
g(x). Now, we can choose different coordinates x′, which agree with x every-
where except in the region free of matter, where they deviate smoothly from
x. The transformation from x to x′ will yield a different representation of
the metric, written g′(x′). Einstein interpreted g′(x′) to be the same field as
g(x), written in different coordinates – one and the same metric has different
components in different coordinate systems; this does not constitute a phys-
ical difference. If we accept general covariance, we can also write the metric
g′ in terms of the original coordinate system x. However, this gives rise to
the problem that the new metric in terms of the original coordinates, g′(x),
deviates from the g(x) inside the designated space-time region: it yields a
different field, despite being expressed in the same coordinates. This consti-
tutes a physical indeterminacy, which is unacceptable; the culprit is general
covariance, which, has to be rejected.
The hole argument is defective, as is well known. The mistake is to
attribute a different physical meaning to the two solutions g(x) and g′(x).
They are just mathematically different expressions of the same physical field.
The source of the mistake is to (implicitly) attribute an independent reality
to the coordinate system x. If the coordinate system would pick out space-
time points uniquely and independently of g and g′, then a disagreement
of g and g′ would be due to physical properties of the space-time point.
However, space-time points are only individuated in virtue of the metric
field. The difference is mathematical, not physical.
Norton’s Conjecture
Norton’s conjecture is that Einstein made the same mistake in the case of the
November tensor: he attributed an independent reality to coordinates. As
a consequence, the covariance of the theory was restricted to the coordinate
conditions used to recover the Newtonian limit.
Einstein’s reasoning might have proceeded along the following lines. The
November tensor, while not generally covariant, is covariant under unimodu-
lar transformations. In the notebook, Einstein examined the transformation
from Minkowski coordinates, xSR, to uniformly rotating coordinates, xROT.
This transformation is nothing but a change of coordinates. It yields a differ-
ent expression for the metric: Starting from the Minkowski metric gSR(xSR),
one arrives at a different metric gROT(xROT) in rotating coordinates. Given
that the Minkowski metric is a solution of the November theory, and be-
cause uniformly rotating coordinates are unimodular, gROT(xROT) is also a
solution of the November theory. This is not yet problematic.
14See Norton (2011) for a discussion of the hole argument.
12
However, it is only unproblematic insofar as gSR and gROT are solutions
in different coordinate system. This is where Einstein might have made
a mistake by interpreting the transformation to gROT differently: He may
have (implicitly) presupposed that gSR and gROT both have to be solutions
in the same coordinate system. He used the Hertz condition to bring the
November tensor into the form required for the Newtonian limit. By checking
whether both gSR and gROT are compatible with the Hertz condition, he
implicitly assumed that these two expressions needed to be compatible with
the same coordinate system, namely the coordinates xHERTZ compatible with
the Hertz condition. He thus expected that gSR(xHERTZ) and gROT(xHERTZ)
both have to be solutions to obtain the Newtonian limit if one uses the Hertz
condition. This, however, is impossible, because the Hertz condition is not
compatible with gROT. This may have led to the rejection of the November
tensor.
The problem is that Einstein used the Hertz condition to check com-
patibility of different expressions of the metric. This effectively limited the
covariance of the theory to the covariance of the coordinate conditions of
the Newtonian limit—the covariance of the Hertz condition in the present
case—and there is no longer a difference between coordinate conditions and
coordinate restrictions. Consequently, at this point, Einstein turned to using
coordinate restrictions, as they had the advantage of yielding simplified field
equations. This also explains why Einstein checked the covariance of the
Hertz condition—he simply attributed a physical meaning to this condition.
Evidence for Norton’s Conjecture
There is no direct evidence for Norton’s conjecture in the Zurich notebook or
in the Entwurf, i.e., it is unclear whether Einstein attributed an independent
reality to coordinate systems at this time. We only have evidence that he did
so in the context of the hole argument. Norton finds that the conjecture is
compatible with Einstein’s pronouncements on coordinate systems between
1912 and 1915 and with his attitude towards general covariance. One piece
of evidence speaking in favor of Norton’s conjecture is a letter to de Sitter,
in which Einstein ties the lack of rotational covariance of the Entwurf field
equations to the rejection of the hole argument. The conjecture establishes
a direct connection between the hole argument and rotational covariance.
Norton locates the strength of the conjecture in its explanatory power,
under the assumption that Einstein was aware of coordinate conditions—we
have seen Norton’s reasons for assuming that Einstein was aware of coordi-
nate conditions in section 3.2 above. The conjecture explains why Einstein
gave up on using coordinate conditions in the notebook, it explains why
he later thought that he did not succeed in deriving the Newtonian limit
from the November tensor, despite a calculation that appears to show the
contrary, and it explains his indifference towards general covariance in the
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Entwurf phase prior to the hole argument.
3.4 The Majority on Norton’s View
The majority fraction of the genesis collaboration has not reacted to Norton’s
conjecture in detail. The majority maintains that the distinction between
coordinate conditions and coordinate restrictions was sufficient for Einstein’s
rejection of the November tensor in the notebook, and they attribute the
revival of the November tensor in 1915 to Einstein’s realization that he could
use coordinate conditions. Here are two reactions of the majority to Norton’s
conjecture.
Jürgen Renn
Jürgen Renn (2004, sec. 2) discusses the question as to why Einstein aban-
doned promising differential operators, such as the Ricci and the November
tensor, in the notebook. Renn asks whether Einstein may have been un-
aware of coordinate conditions in the Zurich notebook – is it possible that
“Einstein could have been guilty of such a trivial error?” (Ibid., p. 12).
He points out that Einstein used harmonic coordinates in the notebook in
the context of the Ricci tensor, which suggests that Einstein was aware of
coordinate conditions. The calculations surrounding the November tensor,
however, tell a different story; they show that Einstein’s understanding of
coordinate conditions differs from the modern view. In particular, Einstein
checked the transformation group of coordinate conditions, which does not
make sense according to the modern view; see section 3.1 above. What could
have induced Einstein to think that coordinates impose real restrictions on
the field equations?
Renn briefly discusses Norton’s answer to this question. He characterizes
Norton’s account as attributing a deep and “conceptual, if not metaphysical”
(p. 14) error to Einstein. Renn is not convinced by Norton’s account:
The evidence available makes it, in my view, implausible that
this was indeed Einstein‚Äôs pitfall in early 1913. If he com-
mitted an error conceptually close to the hole argument then it
becomes incomprehensible why, as the historical documents indi-
cate, Einstein only formulated this argument as late as summer
1913, and from then on regarded it as the life belt of the ‘En-
twurf’ theory, while, before that, he considered its lack of being
generally covariant as a shameful dark spot. (Ibid., p. 14)
Renn mentions the Besso memo in support of this claim. The Besso
memo, probably written on the 28th of August 1913, contains a preliminary
version of the hole argument.15 Renn concludes that the hole argument, or
15The argument for dating the Besso memo is given in Janssen (2007).
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the reasoning underlying the hole argument, is not the “original sin” leading
to the abandonment of the November tensor, and that the only viable expla-
nation is that Einstein really did not have the modern notion of coordinate
conditions.
Michel Janssen
Michel Janssen (2007) comments on Norton’s argument in the context of the
so-called “Besso Memo”, which contains early traces of the hole argument, as
well as reasons for rejecting it. Janssen writes: “It is my belief that Einstein
used coordinate restrictions in the Zurich Notebook simply because he did
not yet have the modern understanding of coordinate conditions. No further
explanation is needed. Consequently, I am skeptical about Norton‚Äôs con-
jecture” (Ibid., p. 828). Janssen does not elaborate on why he believes that
Einstein did not yet have the modern notion of coordinate conditions, and
he does not give further arguments against Norton’s conjecture.
In sum, the majority is skeptical of Norton’s solution, but there is no
sustained engagement with Norton’s arguments. Both Renn and Janssen
point out that the hole argument, which is in the background of Norton’s
conjecture, has a philosophical, conceptual, or even metaphysical ring to it.
This might indicate that Renn and Janssen consider Norton’s proposal to be
somewhat speculative.
4 How to Resolve the Disagreement
Can the dispute between the majority and Norton be resolved? I agree with
Norton that there is, at present, no evidence that could definitively settle the
issue. However, I am optimistic that progress can be made. In this section,
I will suggest several ways in which the debate can be brought forward.
This will prepare the ground for the discussion of the more fundamental
methodological issues in the next section.
Here is a sketch of the disagreement. The main point of contention
is whether Einstein was aware of coordinate conditions at the time of the
notebook. The distinction between coordinate conditions and coordinate
restriction, emphasized by the majority view, only explains Einstein’s rejec-
tion of the November tensor if he was not aware of coordinate conditions. If
it were possible to decide whether or not Einstein was aware of coordinate
conditions, then the disagreement would simply disappear. I will reexamine
this point in section 4.1. Norton claims that Einstein must have been aware
of coordinate conditions. The central piece of evidence for this claim is the
“presumed gravitation tensor”; this is the topic of section 4.2. If Einstein
was aware of coordinate conditions, the change from coordinate conditions
to coordinate restrictions is not accounted for by the distinction between
coordinate conditions and restrictions, and a different explanation for the
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use of coordinate restrictions is needed. Now, Norton’s conjecture comes
into play. The occurrence of coordinate restrictions is explained by Ein-
stein’s mistake of attributing an independent reality to coordinate systems,
a mistake he made in the context of the hole argument later on. By im-
plicitly assigning independent reality to coordinates, Einstein collapsed the
distinction between coordinate conditions and coordinate restrictions in the
notebook. Norton comments on the (theoretical) virtues of his and the ma-
jority’s explanation in various passages. This will be the topic of section
4.3.
4.1 Einstein’s Knowledge of Coordinate Conditions
Did Einstein have the notion of coordinate conditions at the time of the
notebook? Both views seem to agree that, prior to November 1915, there is
no instance where Einstein clearly used coordinate conditions in the modern
sense.16 However, direct evidence is not all that matters. We also have to
take into consideration in how far coordinate conditions were available in
the literature at the time of the notebook. If the notion was available, and
if only in part, the claim that Einstein was aware of coordinate conditions
gains plausibility: he simply had to check the relevant literature.
Both the majority fraction and Norton mention this point only in passing.
There is hardly any discussion of the relevant physical and mathematical
literature. A point mentioned by both parties is that Einstein took harmonic
coordinates from the mathematical literature. Harmonic coordinates were
known as “isothermal coordinates” in the literature on differential geometry
such as Bianchi (1910) and Wright (1908). We know that these works were
familiar to Einstein. But how relevant is this particular kind of coordinates
to the modern notion of coordinate conditions?
To answer this question, we have to examine the two sources just men-
tioned. Here is a brief recapitulation. In Bianchi (1910, ch. 3), a textbook
on differential geometry, it is shown that we can find a coordinatization of
a surface such that the line element takes a particularly simple form. Such
a parametrization exists if the second Beltrami parameter vanishes; this is
mentioned by Einstein on p. 19L, as Norton points out. Bianchi also discusses
the geometrical significance of these systems of curves. Wright (1908) is a
monograph on quadratic differential forms; “isothermal systems of curves”
are discussed in the context of applications of invariant theory. Wright also
states that isothermal systems are tied to the vanishing of the second Bel-
trami parameter.17 This shows that harmonic, or isothermal, coordinates
were well understood mathematically.
16See Janssen and Renn (2007, sec. 1.5) for an argument to this effect. This argument
is neutral with respect to the disagreement discussed here.
17Note that Ricci and Levi-Civita (1901) discuss isothermal surfaces.
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However, the mathematical notion of harmonic coordinates, and the no-
tion of coordinate condition, are quite far apart. Most importantly, the
mathematical literature considered above is completely silent on the issue of
using coordinates in a physical context.18 There is no discussion of using
coordinates to obtain, say, the Newtonian limit—this is not surprising; after
all, these are works on differential geometry and invariant theory, not on
physics. However, adapting coordinates to particular situations is the key
ingredient of the modern notion of coordinate conditions. When considering
the Newtonian limit, we can use a particular set of coordinates for our field
equations, which does not affect the generality of the equations. This idea
does not feature in the mathematical literature. It would be more fruitful to
search the physical literature for seeds of the notion that Einstein needed.
What does this mean for the two diverging views? If the key ingredient
to the modern notion of coordinate condition was not available in the liter-
ature, Einstein had to find the notion on his own. However, there are not
many traces of this search. Thus, the story in Janssen and Renn (2007, sec.
1.5) that the modern notion was forced upon Einstein only in 1915 gains
plausibility as an account of how Einstein did arrive at the modern notion.
This speaks in favor of the majority view.
4.2 Evidence Against the Majority View: “Vermutlicher Grav-
itationstensor”
Norton adduces one central piece of evidence against the majority view:
the labeling of the November tensor as the “presumed gravitation tensor”
(“Vermutlicher Gravitationstensor”) on p. 22R of the notebook; see section
3.2 above. Norton argues that if we adopt a literal reading of this label, then
the November tensor itself is the gravitation tensor, and not an intermediate
step on the way to a different gravitation tensor. This implies that Einstein
would not apply a coordinate restriction to the November tensor, but a
coordinate condition.
How convincing is this argument? Unfortunately, there is no response by
the majority, and the commentary on the notebook in Janssen et al. (2007b)
does not further elaborate on the label. What are the possible explanations
for labeling this part of the expression as the “presumed gravitation ten-
sor”? We cannot reject Norton’s explanation and still claim that the label is
accurate. But other explanations for the label are possible.
Norton writes that the page is neatly written, indicating that p. 22R may
have served as a summary of a calculation or a discussion. One alternative
explanation is that the label served as a mnemonic device: Einstein simply
wanted to mark this part of the expression as relevant, as opposed to its other
18Relevant parts of the modern notion may be discussed elsewhere in the mathematical
literature. There are useful remarks on the history of “Euclidean geometry by means of
general coordinates” in Veblen (1927, pp. 66).
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parts, and to be used as a basis for a “presumed gravitation tensor”. On this
account, the label would have a contrastive role instead of a descriptive one.
Maybe it would have been tedious to write down that the expression should
be the basis for the gravitation tensor, because it may have been clear at
this point that this is out of the question. This does not refute Norton’s
explanation, but it show that other explanations of the label are possible.
A different way of deciding whether or not Norton’s explanation is plau-
sible is to consider other instances of labeling in the notebook. Here is an
example. Einstein labels a different object as “vermutlicher Gravitationsten-
sor” on p. 9L.19 The context of this second occurrence of a candidate gravita-
tion tensor is different—the issue on p. 9L is the gravitational stress-energy
tensor. Also, the handwriting on p. 9L is less tidy than on p. 22R. It is not
clear whether the use of the label on p. 9L speaks in favor or against Nor-
ton’s interpretation of the label on p. 22R, but discussing other instances of
labeling in the notebook might convey a feeling for Einstein’s usual practice.
4.3 Theoretical Virtues: Simplicity and Explanatory Power
An issue that is repeatedly discussed by Norton is the simplicity of the two
views. He thinks that the majority view is the simpler account of why
Einstein considered the November tensor to be untenable in the notebook.
The majority view can account for Einstein’s actions in virtue of just one
distinction, that between coordinate conditions and coordinate restrictions,
and there is no need to explain why Einstein used coordinate conditions in
some contexts, and not in others. Norton, on the other hand, tells a more
complex story, involving a mistake that was made twice, but only appeared
in writing once, in the context of the hole argument.
Of course, Norton’s view is more complex for a reason—it assumes that
Einstein was aware of coordinate conditions, and the view is therefore able
to account for the available evidence under this assumption. Much hinges on
this starting point: Norton’s view rejects the premise of the majority view;
this necessitates the introduction of a more complicated explanation. If the
assumption of Einstein’s awareness of coordinate conditions holds water,
then the complexity of Norton’s view does not speak against it.
Norton also discusses a second notion of simplicity, a quantitative parsi-
mony of mistakes. On this notion of simplicity, Norton’s view is simpler than
the majority view, because it does not “multiply mistakes beyond necessity”.
The majority view has to attribute an “elementary blunder” to Einstein,
that of not being aware of coordinate conditions. On Norton’s view, Ein-
stein committed the elaborate mistake of attributing an independent reality
to coordinate systems in the context of the November tensor, and on top
19Note that the two labels are identical in German (up to the capital letter), but trans-
lated differently in the commentary; see Janssen et al. (2007b, p. 555 and p. 647).
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of this, Einstein repeated this very mistake in the context of the hole argu-
ment. Norton thus proposes a kind of “common cause explanation”: Both
the rejection of the November tensor, and the hole argument, are due to the
same kind of blunder.
How convincing is this “common cause explanation”? One way to criti-
cize it is along the lines of Jürgen Renn (2004); see section 3.4: Under the
assumption that the mistake was already at work in the notebook, Renn
contends, it should have had other observable effects, which, however, we
do not find. This is a problem of (unobserved) consequences of the mistake
conjectured by Norton.
A different line of criticism is to call into question that we are in fact
dealing with just one mistake. One problem might be that the mistake is
not exactly the same in the case of the November tensor and in the case of
the hole argument; the two situations are only analogous. However, if it is
not exactly the same mistake in both cases, should we still count it as one
mistake? Norton emphasizes that the analogy is quite strong. There is not
only a qualitative, but a formal parallel between the two mistakes, as we
have seen in section 3.3. If the parallel between the two situations really is
that strong, the claim of quantitative parsimony seems legitimate.
This observation brings a different problem of Norton’s common cause
explanation to the fore. His view is based on a sophisticated Einstein, who
does not commit elementary blunders, especially when it comes to coordinate
systems. Norton therefore has to presuppose that the mistake of attributing
an independent reality to coordinates was implicit—if Einstein had been
completely aware of the ramifications of the mistake, he would not have
made it. However, if the erroneous reasoning is only implicit, the tie to
Einstein’s later mistake in the hole argument gets weaker. We appreciate
the link between the two mistakes because the parallel is made explicit. If
Einstein would have seen the analogy between the mistakes as presented
by Norton, and given Einstein’s competence when it comes to coordinates
systems—would he still have embraced it? If the parallel between the two
occasions of the mistake was clear to Einstein, it is less plausible that Einstein
would have made the mistake. If, on the other hand, the parallel is unclear,
the common cause explanation gets weaker, and it is dubious that just one
mistake was committed. There is a tension between Einstein’s committing
the mistake consciously, and the force of the common cause explanation.
5 Methodological Issues
In the previous section, I suggested how we might settle the disagreement
in substance. Now I will take a step back and reflect on the nature of
the disagreement. Can we settle the dispute on the basis of the available
evidence? Is the disagreement a matter of personal taste, or are the two
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views based on fundamental methodological differences?
The nice thing about the present case is that the disagreement arose
within a group that has worked in close collaboration on the same evidence,
shares a large part of historical methodology, and has tried to come up
with a common interpretation of the evidence. The dispute is not rooted
in the fact that the two views take different sources into account; rather,
the disagreement concerns the interpretation of evidence. This makes the
problem of deciding between the two views hard, and interesting.
Norton, and the majority fraction of the genesis collaboration, have re-
peatedly commented on their methodology. These methodological remarks
will be my starting point. I will focus on two lessons we can learn from the
present case. The first lesson is positive: The dispute is not a mere matter
of taste—progress is possible. The second lesson is more guarded; it points
out a fundamental methodological problem, the question as to how much
rationality we should ascribe to a historical actor.
5.1 Reconstructing Einstein
In the introduction of his paper, Norton characterizes the problem of deciding
between the two views as a puzzle that lies on the boundary between the clear
and the obscure: It is possible to formulate candidate solutions, but there
is not enough evidence to reach a final verdict. What is at stake is not the
evidence, but the interpretation of evidence, and theoretical considerations.
Norton suggests that we should evaluate the plausibility of the different
views. He writes that when we invoke plausibility, “our personal Einsteins
speak as much as evidence” (Norton, 2007, p. 745).
Is a “personal Einstein” really that important in Norton’s analysis? On
closer inspection, it is not. Norton certainly assigns weights to evidence
in a different way than the majority, but he is always careful to defend
these weights. Arguments decide the outcome of the dispute, not subjective
factors. Instead of different “personal Einsteins”, I prefer to think of different,
argued reconstructions of Einstein that are subject to critical evaluation.
These arguments can be probed further in order to advance the discussion—
we can push the boundaries of the unknown. Above, we saw three ways of
probing the reconstructions of Einstein.
First, if direct evidence cannot settle an issue, we may take further
sources and background knowledge into account. Did Einstein know about
coordinate conditions at the time of the notebook, or did he not? I have
suggested in section 4.1 that we may look at the context if we cannot decide
this question on the basis of the notebook. We can try to determine how
likely it would have been to know about coordinate conditions, given the
mathematical and physical background. If the notion of coordinate condi-
tion was not available at the time, and if there is no evidence of how Einstein
acquired the notion, it gets more implausible that he had the modern notion.
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Second, once we have proposed a certain reconstruction, it can be scruti-
nized anew on the basis of the available evidence. One example is the labeling
of the “presumed gravitation tensor”; see section 4.2 above. Norton’s argu-
ment is based on the assumption that Einstein was accurate when it comes
to labeling. We can now revisit the notebook and compare this instance of
labeling with other instances, and thereby decide whether Einstein really is
that accurate, or whether we can come up with an alternative explanation
that trumps Einstein’s accuracy. A second example of reevaluating a given
reconstruction is Renn’s point that the mistake of attributing an indepen-
dent reality to coordinates should have had observable consequences before
the hole argument.
Third, we can check the internal consistency, or plausibility, of the re-
constructions. I argued in section 4.3 that there is an tension in Norton’s
account between the quantitative parsimony of mistakes on the one hand,
and how consciously the mistake was made on the other.
5.2 Historical Errors: A Dilemma
The episode under dispute depends on the attribution of mistakes to the
historical actor, Einstein. This generates methodological problems. Norton
formulates one of these problems as follows: “Of course it is always possible to
invent hidden errors varying from the trivial slip to the profound confusion,
tailor made to fit this or that aberration” (Norton, 2007, p. 748). If we are
interested in explaining the actual course of events in a historical episode,
the indiscriminate introduction of errors threatens to trivialize the account.
Norton argues that this problem can be overcome by a quantitative parsi-
mony of mistakes. His account of the episode satisfies this constraint: “What
is appealing about the conjecture is that it requires us to posit no new er-
rors” (Ibid., p. 781). According to Norton’s conjecture, we do not have to
multiply mistakes beyond necessity, because Einstein repeated the mistake
of attributing an independent reality to coordinate systems in the context of
the hole argument. I have already pointed out a material problem of Nor-
ton’s conjecture in section 4.3: the mistake might not be exactly the same
in both situations, but only analogous.
However, there is an even more fundamental problem lurking in the back-
ground. Why should we attribute as few errors as possible to Einstein in
principle? Isn’t it natural that scientists commit mistakes? Isn’t it problem-
atic to presuppose that historical actors proceed in a quasi-rational manner?
On the one hand, we can explain any historical episode if we presuppose the
right kind of error at the right moment in history. On the other hand, do
we have good reasons to minimize the amount of errors we conjecture in our
historical accounts? It appears that we face a dilemma. The second horn
of the dilemma has been forcefully formulated by Michel Janssen (2007, p.
832):
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So, to put it somewhat bluntly, whenever one encounters a pas-
sage containing what on the face of it looks like an error on Ein-
stein’s part, the strategy is to look for an interpretation in which
the apparent error is the manifestation of some deep conceptual
difficulty that had to be overcome before general relativity as we
know it could be formulated.
The worry might be that we end up with a reconstruction of Einstein
that is too rational in that it only deviates from the perfect path of discov-
ery if Einstein encounters “deep” difficulties. Janssen discusses this issue in
section 5 of his paper against the background of Einstein scholarship since
the 1980s. Before Norton’s and Stachel’s groundbreaking interpretation of
the notebook, historical reconstructions of the genesis of general relativity
attributed trivial errors to Einstein. For example, these early accounts as-
sumed that Einstein did not know that if one transforms the components
of the metric using coordinate transformations, the resulting expression is
not physically different from the untransformed metric. Norton and Stachel
ruled out this possibility, thus avoiding the first horn of the dilemma. Janssen
finds that while this was an improvement, Norton got too close to the second
horn of the dilemma with his “excessively acute Einstein”. Janssen prefers a
different, “opportunistic” Einstein, who did not follow up on inconsistencies
if they threatened his pet principles.
There is probably no silver bullet for this dilemma. We should avoid the
implausible attribution of trivial errors to Einstein, but also steer clear of
an overly charitable interpretation, or of “overly complex errors”.20 We can
only avoid these pitfalls by scrupulously reconstructing Einstein from the
available evidence.
6 Conclusion
We have seen two accounts of the same historical episode. Both are based
on the same evidence, and still they disagree. The reason for the disagree-
ment lies, first, in the weight assigned to the evidence. For example, Norton
emphasizes the case of the “presumed gravitation tensor”; the majority view
does not discuss this point. A second source of disagreement is a differ-
ent view on the (background) knowledge we may attribute to Einstein, or
when and how Einstein acquired this knowledge. Did Einstein know about
the freedom to apply coordinate conditions? Here, both camps have merely
sketched the context. Third, the two views have, implicitly and explicitly,
20It would be desirable to get a better systematic understanding of the role of errors
in this episode. Such an understanding might be gained on the basis of the so-called
“dynamical inferential conception” of the application of mathematics, proposed in Räz
and Sauer (2015). This framework systematizes different kinds of mistakes that can be
made in the context of applying mathematics to empirical problems.
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emphasized different theoretical virtues. The majority emphasizes one dis-
tinction as crucial, while Norton has a more intricate story that connects
the notebook to one other important episode in the genesis of GR. Norton’s
position might be more speculative and, therefore, also more susceptible to
criticism.
The methodological discussion has shown that fundamental methodolog-
ical issues play a role in the disagreement as well. On the one hand, the
majority view attributes a mistake to Einstein that may seem elementary
from a modern perspective. On the other hand, Norton’s view constructs
an elaborate mistake, which would persist for some time and resurface later.
While the first view may run the risk of telling too simple a story and trivial-
ize the episode, the other may be conceived as painting a picture of Einstein
that is too rational.
Despite these difficulties, there is reason for hope; progress is possible
at all points. We can try to decide on the relevance of evidence by com-
paring similar cases; we can make an effort to reconstruct the background
knowledge; we can adduce philosophical and psychological theories in order
to understand how the transfer of knowledge from one field to another works,
and to understand what kind of mistake we may attribute to historical actors.
All of this will lead to an improved reconstruction of Einstein.
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